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PREFACE 
Since the end of World War II a great deal of attention has been 
given to one of the most dramatic events of the war--the dropping of the 
atomic bomb. This event is often credited with bringing the war.to an 
end. Less study, though, has been directed at the role of the policy 
which persisted during the last two years of the war to serve as the 
sole means of ending the conflict. The unconditional surrender policy 
became an issue among American officials who felt the Japanese would 
never accept it without significant modifications. One purpose of this 
thesis will be to examine dissension toward the policy and reasons for 
the continuation of the formula. Another purpose will be to examine the 
Japanese reaction and note the variety of responses by the Japanese 
hierarchy. 
No work of this nature is completed without aid and advice from a 
number of sources. I was fortunate that Dr. Sidney D. Brown channeled 
my basic interest in Asian civilizations into meaningful studies. Dr. 
John A. Sylvester served as reader and critic and gave immeasurable 
assistance as such. Finally, to Faye for all those reasons one dedicates 
and is dedicated to his wife, and for other reasons that she knows. 
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CHAPTER I 
ORIGIN OF THE UNCONDITIONAL 
SURRENDER POLICY 
In connection with World War II peace negotiations, President 
Roosevelt first used the term unconditional surrender at the Casablanca 
Conference in January, 1943. From its inception controversy has sur-
rounded the policy, and there is even a lack of certainty and a differ-
ence of opinion as to the exact origin of the term as -it applied to the 
settlement of World War II. 
General Eisenhower noted that President Roosevelt had used the 
phrase at a Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on January 7, 1943,1 prior to 
and in preparation for the Casablanca Conference, leading one to believe 
that the term had not 11 flashed 11 through the President'.s mind as he liked 
to have people suppose. Two military historians confirmed Eisenhower's 
assertion that the President used the unconditional surrender term at 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, and in their research they found that 
"no study of this formula was made at the time by the army staff, or by 
the joint staff either before or after the President I s comment. 112 Robert 
1Dwight Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Company, 1958), p. 489n7. 
2Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, United States .Br.ml, in World 
War ..u_. The War Department: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 
1941-42 (Washington, D. C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Department of the Army, 1953), p. 380. 
1 
Sherwood has pointed out that Roosevelt liked to think of himself as a 
"frivolous fellow 11 who decided policy on the 11 spur-of-the-moment. 113 
2 
This might be an indication that the President was confident of his 
ability to formulate policy without preparation. Yet Norman H. Davis, 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security Problems, had apprised the 
President of the subcommittee's consensus that "nothing short of uncon-
ditional surrender by the principal enemies, Germany and Japan, could be 
accepted .... " Although the actual date of the meeting between Roosevelt 
and Davis is unknown, it is certain that it was prior to Casablanca and 
possibly as early as April 15, 1942. 4 
It was Sunday, January 24, 1943, at a press conference that 
Roosevelt first publicly used the term. British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill was present and was at best ambiguous about his part in form-
ing this policy. The President's son, Elliott Roosevelt, noted that 
Churchill heard the President use the term the day before the press meet-
ing, and the Prime Minister even toasted unconditional surrender as they 
worked out a draft for the conference communique. 5 Churchill declared 
in his multivolume history of the war that he had no recollection of the 
things mentioned in Elliott Roosevelt's book, but thought that the idea 
might have come up during informal talks. In July, 1949, during Parlia-
mentary debates, Churchi 11 reiterated "with equa 1 inaccuracy" -C the Prime 
3Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: an Intimate History {New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 696. 
4u. S. Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 
1939-45 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 127. 
5Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It {New York: Duell, Sloan, and 
Pearce, 1946), pp. 117 and1T9.Seealso: Lord Hankey, Politics: 
Trials and Errors (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1950), p. 28. 
3 
Minister's words) that the first time he heard the term was at the press 
conference. Churchill's political colleague, Anthony Eden, finally 
established that Churchill had sent a message to Clement Attlee, Deputy 
Prime Minister, proposing the term as a policy toward Germany and Japan 
on January 19, 1943; Churchill later admitted that he had also used the 
phrase in a conversation with FDR on January 20, 1943. 6 
There seems to be ample evidence that Roosevelt had given considera-
tion to the idea of unconditional surrender before the press meeting. 
Harry Hopkins noticed that the President had notes at the press meeting 
at Casablanca which he consulted occasionally. These notes mentioned 
the term and Hopkins• biographer thought it was a true and deliberate 
statement of FDR's policy. 7 Samuel I. Rosenman, a confidant to the 
President, also thought the statement had been carefully thought out. 8 
Roosevelt's explanation was that as he thought of the difficulty of get-
ting the French Generals Henri Giraud and Charles De Galle together, he 
likened it in his mind to the difficulty of arranging a meeting between 
Lee and Grant toward the end of the Civil War. Suddenly he remembered 
that Grant had been ca 11 ed 11 0 l d Uncondi ti ona l Surrender, 11 and the next 
thing he knew he had used the term as policy for ending the war. 9 
Actually Grant had used the term at the battle of Ft. Donelson in 
response to a message asking for conditions of surrender for the 
6winston s. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV: The Hinge of 
Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), pp. 684-85, 687-88. See 
also: Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 972-73n. 
7sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 696-97. 
8samuel I. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1952), p. 371. --
9sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 696. 
4 
Confederate forces led by General Simon B. Buckner. Contrary to the 
President's memory, the Union General's terms were quite liberal to Lee 
at Appomattox. 10 Grant's terms, limited to one battle, were not meant 
to encompass a policy toward the whole of the Confederacy; and were 
given without prior consultation or consideration of future political 
consequences. 
Whatever circumstances led the President to inaugurate this policy, 
there is no question that he continued to support it and often repeated 
that unconditionality was the only means of surrender for the Axis. 
Later during the war when there was talk of modifying the formula, the 
President maintained his desire to keep it. Roosevelt, nonetheless, 
seemed determined that unconditional surrender would not be associated 
with a harsh peace. At the time of Casablanca he emphasized the uncon-
ditional surrender meant only a reasonable assurance for world peace, 
that it meant the destruction of a philosophy based on conquest, and not 
the destruction of populations. 11 In an address given on February 12, 
1943, the President stated that unconditional surrender was not to be 
used harshly against the people of the Axis nations, but the intention 
was to impose punishment on the "guilty, barbaric leaders. 1112 
It is clearly evident that Roosevelt was determined that the policy 
be carried out and that from the first he intended that the Japanese be 
10Grant's exact words to Buckner were: "No terms except an uncon-
ditional and immediate surrender can be accepted." J. G. Randall and 
David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction {Boston: D. C. Heath and 
Company, 1961)--;-p. 204. --
11sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 696. 
12u. S. Department of State, Bulletin, VIII {February 13, 1943), 
President Franklin Roosevelt, "The War," 146. 
5 
included in the unconditional formula. As noted earlier, the Sub-
committee on Security Problems had named Japan as one of the principal 
enemies to which the policy should be directed, and Churchill 1 s message 
to Attlee on January 19, 1943, mentioned the policy as pointed at Japan 
as well as Germany. Five days later at the Casablanca Conference the 
President stated that 11 the elimination of German, Japanese, and Italian 
war power means the unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy, and 
Japan. 1113 On another occasion, February 12, 1943, the President said, 
" ... our policy toward our Japanese enemies is precisely the same as our 
policy toward our Nazi enemies: it is the policy of fighting hard on all 
fronts and ending the war as quickly as we can on the uncompromising 
terms of unconditional surrender. 1114 At a press conference in Hawaii 
July 29, 1944, when FDR was asked if he was going to make unconditional 
surrender his goal in the Pacific, he replied that at Casablanca he had 
made no differentiation between the European enemy and the Far Eastern 
enemy; "the same thing applied to Japan, 11 he declared. 15 
The reasons behind Roosevelt 1 s initiation of the unconditional 
policy are not easily ascertained. Sherwood is one of several writers 
who felt that the President was influenced by the Armistice of 1918. 16 
The failure of Wilson 1 s idealistic scheme for making peace, the subse-
quent rise of Nazism, and Hitler 1 s abusive speeches toward the Versailles 
Diktat were most likely in the President's mind as he began to formulate 
13Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, pp. 370-71. 
14u. s. Department of State, Bulletin, VIII, 146. 
15Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, pp. 370-71. 
16sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 791. 
6 
a policy for ending the war. 
Representative Jessie Sumner of Illinois in a speech on the floor 
of the House of Representatives recalled for the President's attention 
the Armistice of 1918. She noted that Roosevelt himself had used a 
negotiated peace--a taboo term to the New Dealers, she contended--with 
Darlan for entrance into Africa and with Bagdolio to secure the surrender 
of Italy. She questioned the wisdom of insisting ·on unconditional sur-
render and referred the President to a book by Harry R. Rudin on the 
World War I Armistice. 17 Rudin revealed that in World War I there had 
been a vigorous effort to have unconditional surrender as the policy for 
ending the war. During the final months of the war after Wilson had 
issued his "Fourteen Points" calling for a negotiated peace, several 
Senators took issue with the President and demanded an unconditional sur-
render of Germany. 18 Critics of the President in Congress read letters 
from their constituents to show that American citizens were demanding 
unconditional surrender. Even Colonel House in his diary indicated the 
"nearly unanimous sentiment in this country against anything but uncon-
ditional surrender as the motto for the war.11 General Pershing, head of 
the American Expeditionary Forces, stated in a memorandum to the Supreme 
Command that he believed the only way to obtain a complete victory was to 
continue the war until Germany had surrendered unconditionally. 19 
17u. s. Congress, House. Remarks of Miss Jessie Sumner, "Uncon-
ditional Surrender." 79th Cong., 1st sess., January 9, 1945. Congres-
sional Record, XCI, 145. 
18senators Lodge of Massachusetts, Poindexter of Washington and 
Johnson of California desired unconditional surrender. Lodge of Massa-
chusetts declared to the press on one occasion: "I believe in a dictated, 
not a negotiated peace." Harry R. Rudin, Armistice .lila (New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1944), pp. 173 and 106. 
19Ibid., pp. 106, 103, 124, and 184-86. 
7 
Representative Sumner observed that terms such as "negotiated 
peace and unconditional surrender" had become betes noirs to the 
leaders of 1918. She believed that the lesson to be learned from World 
War I was the senselessness of fighting on blindly until unconditional 
surrender could be obtained since Wilson had been able to secure every 
concession he asked through a negotiated peace.· She concluded, there-
fore, that the unconditional surrender policy was an anachronism. 20 
Another reason for initiating and promoting the unconditional 
policy was that the President felt it would have positive propaganda 
effects in the Allied countries. The pol icy was to give the Allies a 
common goal of victory and possibly strengthen their resolve during the 
war. The average person would accept unconditional surrender as the 
just deserts for countries who would precipitate an international war. 
Vet international legal problems were involved in a policy so broad 
and vaguely defined as unconditional surrender. Historically, surrender 
has been defined as a giving up by a military commander of an area or 
group under his command, quite similar to the way it was used by Grant 
in the Civil War. Surrender, therefore, does not usually constitute a 
form of ending the war, but as President Roosevelt used the term, it 
implied a political ~ct; that is, the conquered countries would be com-
pletely controlled by the victorious ones. There seems to be no prece-
dent for the manner in which the .President used the term. 21 Although 
20u. S. Congress, House. Sumner, "Unconditional Surrender," p. 146. 
21 Francis C. Balling, "Unconditional Surrender and a Unilateral 
Declaration of Peace," American Political Science Review, XXXIX (1945), 
474. Balling preferred as a more exact term for the President's policy: 
"political capitulation stipulating unconditional surrender." pp. 475-76. 
8 
there might be advantages in the policy, e.g. flexibility since the 
policy would be unilaterally declared, there are also problems. It 
would, of course, be political suicide to the government which yielded 
to such a demand, and it would be viewed at a later period as a forced 
measure and would assume an aura much as the Treaty of Versailles did to 
the Germans in the 1930's. 22 Unconditional surrender would seem to be a 
contradiction in itself since surrender presupposes conditions. 
International legal problems would not have stood in the way of 
implementing the policy if there had been a degree of certainty in its 
applicability and success. Since there could be no such guarantee, 
Allied response revealed a wide range of impressions to the unconditional 
policy. Japanese reaction eventually polarized around two groups--the 
peace party and the war-continuation faction who disagreed on Japan's 
ability to continue the war and the necessity of accepting unconditional 
surrender. 
22 rbid., pp. 478-80. See also: Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Sur-
render; the Politics of Victory and Defeat (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 236. 
CHAPTER II 
ALLIED RESPONSE AND JAPANESE REACTION 
TO UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER 
Generally the policy of unconditional surrender was not well 
received by the leadership groups in America and in the Allied countries, 
particularly because of its vagueness and the supposed difficulty in 
defining the term. There was also a fear that it might be a stumbling 
block to future negotiations for peace. Actually, none of the Allies 
were ever to take a definite position on unconditional surrender, so it 
was to remain essentially an American policy. 
Winston Churchill showed his ability to equivocate on a sensitive 
issue. His position could probably be best defined as supporting the 
policy, yet desiring to lessen its psychological impact lest it be used 
for propaganda purposes by the Axis and made to appear as a harsh policy 
for peace. In a House of Commons speech February 11, 1943, he stated: 
11 But our inflexible insistence on unconditional surrender does not mean 
that we shall stain our victorious arms by any cruel treatment of whole 
populations, but ... no vestige of the Japanese war plotting machine will 
be left to us when the work is done. 111 Robert Sherwood corresponded 
with Churchill in an attempt to discover the Prime Minister's views on 
1Lord Hankey, Politics: Trials and Errors (Chicago: Henry Regnery 
Company, 1950), p. 32. 
9 
10 
the formula and was told that he would not have used the term himself. 2 
Churchill emphasized this position when he wrote in his book on World 
War II: 11 I felt there would be no rigid insistence upon unconditional 
surrender apart from what was necessary for world peace and future 
security ... 113 Churchill's position was a sort of accommodation to a 
fait accompli which he had no great influence in planning. 
The British Foreign Office did not like the term. The Foreign 
Office foresaw difficulties in adequately defining the term and was also 
worried about its propaganda effects in the Axis nations. The term 
"prompt surrender" was preferred over the more severe sounding uncon-
ditional surrender. 4 
If Churchill's position on unconditional surrender was ambiguous, 
Stalin's was at best confusing. Contrary to the President's belief that 
"Old Joe" would like the idea, Stalin's reaction was at first less than 
enthusiastic, and only later did he accept the policy, then with mixed 
feelings. William Phillips, a political advisor to Eisenhower, noted 
5 that Stalin had opposed the policy at Teheran in December, 1943 .. 
Cordell Hull, Secretary of State at that time, defined the Russian 
position as desiring a clearer definition of the term as it played on 
2Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins; an Intimate History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 696.-
3Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI: Triumph and 
Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953T, p. 642. 
4Robert Murphy, Diplomat Amo)g Warriors {Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1964, pp. 239-40. See also: John L. 
Chase, "Unconditional Surrender Reconsidered," Political Science 
Quarterly, LXX (June, 1955), 259; and Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of 
Cordell Hull (New York: MacMillan Company, 1948), p. 1571. 
5Hull, Memoirs, p. 1571. 
11 
Axis fears of the unknown. 6 The fact that the Russians did not use the 
formula in discussions with the Finns when the two countries were 
negotiating for peace was an indication they were not entirely committed 
to the policy. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden tried to use the 
Russian approach to Finland as an opportunity to soften unconditional 
surrender, but he still felt that the policy was desirable when applied 
to Germany and Japan. 7 
It is difficult to ascertain exactly when the Marshal began to 
consider the formula worthwhile,8 but by the last months of the war he 
desired its application to Japan. Although he saw continued resistance 
by the Japanese if the policy was retained, he was in favor of main-
taining it. Harry Hopkins reported that in his talks with Stalin the 
Marshal had preferred to go through with unconditional surrender so 
that the Japanese military might be destroyed once and for all. He 
thought, however, that if the Japanese sought softer terms, or if uncon-
ditional surrender became a stumbling block to negotiations, the Allies 
should be prepared to accept a negotiated surrender. Stalin believed 
that unconditional surrender could be effected during the occupation. 9 
6Ibid., pp. 1571-74; and Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 782. 
7Hull, Memoirs, pp. 1574-75. 
81. Deutscher, Stalin,~ Political Biography {New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1949), p. 521, set the date at May, 1943. Herbert 
Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They 
Sought (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), 
pp. 220-21, thought mid-1943. Anne Armstrong, Unconditional Surrender; 
the Impact of the Casablanca Policy on World War ll (New Brunswick, New 
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1961), p. 55, suggested it was at 
Yalta in February, 1945. 
9Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 115; 
William D. Leahy,.!_ Was There, the Personal Story of the Chief of Staff 
12 
President Roosevelt's Secretary of State was not present at Casa-
blanca, and his absence further strengthens the belief that the Presi-
dent made the policy of unconditional surrender without consulting his 
associates as to its wisdom. Hull's absence also reflected the declin-
ing importance of the State Department in wartime foreign policy making. 
Dean Acheson, Truman's post-war Secretary of State, at this time an 
assistant to Hull, wrote of a "drifting State Department" without a 
firm policy on the conduct of the war. Acheson thought there ought to 
have been something a little better than Roosevelt's unconditional 
formula and faulted the Department, himself included, for not making 
contributions to the "achievement of political purposes through the 
war. 1110 John J. McCloy of the War Department later wrote that during 
this period officials concentrated so heavily on the war effort that 
they overlooked political considerations. 11 Since neither the State 
Department nor Hull had had a part in making the policy, it took them 
by surprise, and they generally opposed it. Hull thought the Allied 
policy for peace should be more flexible; yet he did think that "in 
some cases the most severe terms should be imposed. I had Germany and 
to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made 
at the Time {New York: Whittlesey House, 195~ p. 383; and Harry S:-
Truman,~oirs, Vol. I: Year of Decisions (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Company, l9ssJ:°~ 265. 
10Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 
1941-45 {New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 53; and Dean 
Acheson, Present at the Creation; & Years in the State Department (New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), p. 38. 
11 John J. McCloy, The Challenge to American Foreign Policy (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 44. 
13 
Japan in mind in this connection. 1112 
Because of bronchitis Admiral William D. Leahy did not attend 
Casablanca either but met with the President afterwards and was briefed 
on the developments at the Conference. He also considered the uncon-
ditional doctrine a "surprising development," and from a military point 
of view the Admiral thought its execution might add to " ..• difficulties 
in succeeding campaigns because it would mean that we would have to 
destroy the enemy. 1113 In Leahy 1 s memoirs he erred or became confused 
on two points concerning the doctrine. For one thing he thought that 
the policy had not been discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 14 
This is contrary to General Eisenhower 1s assertion and the evidence 
obtained by Matloff and Snell in their volume of the military history 
series. 15 For another, he asserted that 11 at Casablanca and subsequent 
meetings we had not agreed with anybody to demand an unconditional 
surrender of Japan. 1116 This ignored the President 1 s statement that 
clearly included the Japanese in the unconditional policy. 17 
It is very likely that the unconditional policy had the effect of 
unifying the United Nations on a definite program for ending the war. 
The policy helped to commit them to carrying on the war until the vic-
tory was final. Yet in many respects it is questionable if the concept 
12Hull, Memoirs, p. 1570. 
13Leahy, l Was There, p. 145. 
14Ibid. 
15see Chapter I, Note 1. 
16Leahy, l Was There, p. 385. 
17see Chapter I, pp. 4-5. 
14 
had value in regard to the Japanese. During the final months of the war 
it remained a dread and mysterious tenn, and tended to polarize Japanese 
officials around the idea of a fight-to-the-death struggle or to sur-
render without relinquishing the normal rights of belligerents, which to 
the Japanese meant the retention of the Emperor. 
The unconditi-onal surrender pol icy had not really come to the atten-
tion of the Japanese until the Cairo Declaration, November and December, 
1943. 18 Only after unconditional surrender·had been officially pro-
claimed at Cairo did the Japanese begin to take the doctrine -seriously. 
Former Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru19 declared that he then 
realized that ''nothing but practically _unconditional surrender could 
save the cou.ntry. 1120 The Cairo Declaration was viewed only as a basis 
for negotiations which would not act~ally be applied. It was felt that 
through negotiations the terms might be lessened, since the Japanese 
still considered themselves in a viable military position. 21 The 
Japanese could understand provisions of the Cairo Declaration for taking 
their territories if they were defeated, but unconditional surrender 
18Robert Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1954), p. 39; and F. C. Jones, Japan's New 
Order in East Asia; Its Rise and Fall, 1937-45 (New York: Oxford 
University Preis-;-1954T,P:-423. --_ 
19In this paper all Japanese names will be written with family 
names first. 
20eutow, Decision to Surrender, p. 25n45. 
21 United States, Strategic Bambi ng Survey, lnterrogati·ons of 
Ja anese Officials, II (Washington, D. C.: Government·Printing Office, 
1946; 320, interrogating Toyoda. Hereafter referred to as USSBS, 
Inter,rogations, II. 
seemed unrealistic and out of the question. 22 Japanese response, 
therefore, was directed mainly to the Potsdam Declaration which called 
for unconditional surrender of the armed forces. 23 
15 
After discussions were held among the Japanese leaders, it was 
decided that there should be no official comment on the Potsdam 
Declaration. Foreign Minister Togo was instrumental in getting this 
decision, and since he felt that the first reactions to the Declaration 
were not entirely bad, he was optimistic about negotiations to clear up 
any difficulties. 24 His idea was to remain silent perhaps noting that 
since there had been a change between the Cairo and Potsdam Declara-
tions, other more substantial changes might follow. Unfortunately 
Premier Suzuki was influenced by the opposition of the military and 
announced that the Japanese reaction. was that of. 11 mokusatsu. 1125 The 
problem. lay in the translation· and interpretation of this term.. Kawai 
Kazuo; editor tif the Nippori Times during the wari has contended that it 
has no exact equivalent in English, but the best translation is probably 
22united States, Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan's Stru~gle to End 
the War (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1946, pp. 5 and 
'6:- Hereafter referred to as USSBS, Japan's Struggle. Lester Brooks, 
Behind Japan's Surrender (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 115-16. 
23see Chapter IV for details on the conference and the declaration. 
24Togo Shigenori, The Cause of Japan, trans. and ed. Togo Fumihiko 
and Ben Bruce Blakeney (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), p. 311. 
25suzuki's words were: "I consider the joint proclamation of the 
three powers to be a rehash of the Cairo Declaration. The government 
does not regard it as a thing of any great value; the government will just ignore [mokusatsu] it. 11 Butow, Decision to Surrender, p. 148. See 
also Togo, Cause of Japan, pp. 313-14; Shigemitsu Mamoru, Japan and Her 
Destiny;~ Struggle for Peace, trans. Oswald White, ed. Major General 
F.S.G. Piggott (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1958), p. 358; 
and Nippon Times, July 30, 1945, p. 1. 
"to withhold comment." Instead it was picked up by the newspapers and 
translated variously: "rejection by ignoring," "silent contempt," or 
"unworthy of public notice. 1126 Kato Masuo, a Japanese reporter for 
the Domei News Agency at the time,- has declared that at no -time was it 
actually rejected but was carefully being considered. 27 · Nevertheless 
the Premier did call it 11 a thing of no great value.._ and only a "rehash 
of the Cairo Declaration." 
16 
In the ·United States the Premier's statement was translated in -the 
pejorative sense. 28 Members of the American government were outspoken 
on Suzuki's statement. Under· Secretary Joseph Grew called it unfortun--
ate if not "utterly stupid. 1129 Secretary of State Byrnes and Secretary 
of War Stimson both declared that this statement was largely responsible 
for-the use of.the atomic bomb. 39 It-has even been asserted that this 
statement was used as a pretext fo.r Russia I s entry· into the war. 31 
26Kawai Kuzuo, "Mokusatsu, Japan's Response to the Potsdam Declara-
tion," Pacific Historical Review, XIX (1950), 412-13; Shigemitsu, 
Struggle for Peace;· p. 358;· and Kase Toshikazu, Journey ·to the Missouri· 
New Haven: ·va1e·university Press, 1950), p. 211. 
27 Ka to Masuo, The Lost War;· !. Japanese Reporter I s Inside Story (New York: ·Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p: 234. 
28An editorialist of the New York Times wrote: 11 ••• the Imperial 
Japanese Government has officiaiTy rejected the .Alli es I unconditional 
surrender ultimatum as beneath its notice and unworthy of a formal 
reply." July 30, 1945, p. 18. 
29Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era; A Diplomatic Record of Forfy Years, 
ed. Walter Johnson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19521, p. 426.' 
30James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1947), p. 263; and Henry L. :Sti-mson and Mc~eorge Bundy, On Active 
Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers,1957), p. 625. 
31 Kawai, 11 Mokusatsu,." p. 414; Shigemitsu, Struggle for Peace,_ 
p. 359; a-nd -Ka-se, Journey to the Missouri , · p .. 211 . See Bu tow, Decision 
to· S~rrender, ;llP. 1s·a~.547for-~the· Sovt-et -Deel a·Nti'on ··of wa·r. 
17 
Suzuki has continued to be an enigma. From the time he became 
Premier until his resignation, no one could ever be quite certain of his 
position on ending the war. Suzuki assumed the premiership on the dis-
solution of the Koiso Cabinet in April, 1945, which fell largely because 
of the loss of Okinawa. The Prime Minister's ambiguity during his 
tenure arose partly from his fear of assassination by radical elements 
within the army which to the very end pressed for a continued struggTe. 32 
This is understandable since Suzuki was wounded in an abortive attempt 
by the Imperial Way Faction, an ultranationalist group within the army, 
to gain control of the government by assassinating the more moderate 
members of the service. 33 
The old Admiral may also have been employing a subtle Japanese art 
known as haragei. To say one thing but to mean another is the idea 
behind haragei, in the hope that the person to whom you are talking will 
know your true feeling while any uninvited listener will be confused. 
Perhaps to the military Suzuki put up a front of continued resistance 
while his friends would know that he desired efforts for peace. 34 In 
statements to the press and in speeches to the Diet, therefore, it would 
seem that Suzuki had resumed the attitude of the two previous Premiers 
32Mark Gayn, Japan Diary (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 
1948), p. 287; Candee Yale Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy,_!_ 
Study of Civil-Militar Rivalry, 1930-1945-i-Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1957 , p. 198; and Butow, Decision to Surrender, p. 75. 
33Kuroki Yukichi, "From War to Peace Cabinets," Contem orar Japan: 
~ Review of Japanese Affairs, XIV (April-December, 1945 , p. 183. 
34Hashimoto Tetsuma, Untold Story of Japanese-American Negotiations 
(Tokyo: Shiunso Press, 1946), p. 129; USSBS, Japan's Struggle, p. 6; 
Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 198; and Butow, Decision 
to Surrender, p. 70. 
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by calling for renewed efforts in the prosecution of the war. 35 Yet 
Foreign Minister Togo who had discussed at length with the Premier his 
outlook on finalizing the war, interpreted his speeches as mere rhetoric. 
Togo was later to state: "It may be that occasionally he [Suzuki] was 
obliged to say things he did not mean. Although he may have been vacil-
lating at times, I believe I can safely say that his determination to 
conclude an early peace remained unchanged. 1136 Fear of assassination 
might well have been a motivating factor in the use of haragei, but it 
must be understood that these concepts do not give a full explanation of 
Suzuki's disposition. His lack of information on the military situation 
and his unwitting use by the military die-hards--best seen in his moku-
satsu statement--led him at times to believe that Japan could be saved 
even at that late date. 
There is little question on the attitude of the military. Former 
wartime Premier Tojo had become a member of the jushin (senior states-
men) who advised the Emperor on choosing new premiers, and so had a 
part in suggesting a new man when it was felt Koiso should not continue. 
Tojo had been opposed to Suzuki as a new premier since he felt the issue 
on choosing a new premier should be the Admiral's war policy. He con-
sidered "either to fight to a finish or to make peace, even if it means 
35
suzuki ca 11 ed for the death of "one hundred mi 11 ion II rather than 
surrender. Nippon Times, April 9, 1945, p. 1; in a speech to the 87th 
Extraordinary Session of the Diet, June 9, 1945, Suzuki stated, 11 ! hear 
the enemy is now urging an unconditional surrender .... There is but one 
way for our nation to follow, and that is to fight to the very end to 
guard our self-existence." Kase, Journey to the Missouri, p. 151; and 
Butow, Decision to Surrender, pp. 68-69. ---
36Butow, Decision to Surrender, pp. 72-73 and 73n52. 
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unconditional surrender" the essential question. 37 · Since he desired a 
"fight to the finish, 11 he opposed Suzuki whom he presumed too concilia-
tory. Suzuki was supported by the rest of the senior statesmen since 
they felt he would not be swayed by the army. Actually his appointment 
came more as a result of a direct imperial command than in the tradi-
tional manner of advice to the throne by the jushin. 38 This gave him 
the opportunity to be independent of any facti·ona 1 contro 1 . 
After the Potsdam Declarati9p, opposition on the part of the mili-
tary to unconditional surrender increased. General Minami Jira, one of 
the more moderate generals, said in an interview that "the peace condi-
tions [Potsdam] actually mean unconditional surrender. · They also make 
clear the enemy's desire to control the world. 1139 There are also 
indications that after dissemination of the -document,· telegrams poured 
in from frontl i ne commanders calling for a rejection of unccmdi ti ona 1 
surrender. 40 
The military had regained the law in May, 1936, which required that 
only generals and admirals on active duty could be appointed as Army-
Navy Minister. The result was to make cabinets dependent on military 
support. The ability of the military to break up cabinets by resigning 
was a constant threat to the Suzuki cabinet group which was looking to 
an early surrender. 
The military leadership was burdened by a bure~ucratic concept 
37Jones, Japan's New Order, p. 431. 
38Kuroki, "From War to Peace Cabinets, 11 ·pp. 184-85. 
39Nippon Times, July 30, 1945, p. 1. 
40sutow, Decision to Surrender, p. 148. 
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known as 9ekokujo-- 11 rule of the higher by the lower. 1141 Often men in 
lower hierarchical positions were able to pressure their superiors 
through the use of gekokujo. An example of this concept was in the use 
of ringisei, one of the peculiar characteristics of Japanese administra-
tion. This is usually in the form of a policy paper drafted by a low-
ranking official who has no real authority himself. As the document is 
passed through the bureaucracy, there is a tendency for higher officials 
to accept it without change or modification. In essence, therefore, 
decision-making takes place in the lower echelons, where administrators 
will bear no responsibility and often feel none, and to a great extent 
have a myopic view of the situation on which they write. 42 This was 
particularly true during the final days of the war when the secretariat 
to the military cabinet members pressured for war continuation. 
The navy was often more willing than the army to obtain a realistic 
view of the war situation;43 therefore, Tojo's Navy Minister Shimada 
assigned Rear Admiral Takagi Sokichi to investigate Japan's war poten-
tial. Takagi carried out his investigation from September, 1943, to 
February, 1944, but because he went far beyond what Tojo's cabinet mem-
bers had in mind, he withheld his information until a more propitious 
moment. His conclusion was that Japan could not possibly win and must 
41 Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, 
edo Ivan Morris (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 109-11 and 
322. 
42rsuj-i'.: Kiyoaki, 11 Deci si on-Making in the Japanese Government: a 
Study of Rin isei, 11 Robert E. Ward, ed., Political Development in 
Modern Japan Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), 
pp. 457-68. 
43ussss, Japan's Struggle, p. 3; Butow, Decision to Surrender, 
pp. 21 and 22; and Gayn, Japan Diary, pp. 274-76 and 280. 
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seek a compromise peace. When Admiral Yanai Mitsumasa became Navy 
Minister during the Koiso Cabinet, he was inclined toward Takagi 1 s 
views. Takagi had trusted Yanai as being one who supported peace moves 
and had given him the results of the investigation in March, 1944. 44 
The military made use of publicists for propaganda purposes, 
especially to mold public opinion in favor of the continuation of the 
war. 45 One example of this use was during the incident of Suzuki's 
statement of mokusatsu. Although an agreement had been made in the 
cabinet that editorial comment should not be made.on the Potsdam 
Declaration until the government had had time to review it thoroughly, 
Foreign Minister Togo feared that War Minister Anami was attempting to 
persuade newspapers to interpret the term in a negative sense. 46 Togo 
was able to prevent the War Minister from having mokusatsu interpreted 
by the newspapers as "rejecting by ignoring," but Anami used his power 
during the tense moments when peace was almost assured. On August 11 
and 12, 1945, newspapers carried headlines such as "War Minister Exhorts 
Army in Stirring Call .•• [to] Press Forward to Smash Enemies •.• " and 
"Total Wartime Effort Asked Japanese Nation. 1147 Newspapers were not 
allowed to print certain sections of the Potsdam Declaration. Phrases 
such as the Japanese mi 1 i tary forces "shall be permitted to return to 
44Kase, Journey to the Missouri, p. 213. 
45Kawai, "Mokusatsu, 11 p. 412. 
46zacharias felt that the Japanese navy was on the United States• 
side in the sense of bringing the war to a close, so in his broadcasts 
he made no mention of Japanese naval ineffectiveness. Ellis M. 
Zacharias, Secret Missions; the Story of an Intelligence Officer (New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946), p. 360. 
47Nippon Times, August 11 and 12, 1945, p. 1 on both days. 
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their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives" 
or "We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or 
destroyed as a nation. ,.4B It was not unti 1 the end of the war that 
newspapers were permitted to print the full texts of both the Cairo and 
Potsdam Declarations. 49 
Nevertheless, the newspapers themselves printed their own harangues 
against the Allies and their proposals. On the first of August, 1945, 
the Domei News Agency called the Potsdam Deel arati on 11 a one-man show put 
on by America." The agency did note a change between the Cairo and the 
Potsdam Declaration but considered this merely subterfuge and warned 
against 11 the enefl\.Y's political offensive which will be continued in the 
future and especially against his scheming propaganda. 1150 The news-
papers also quoted sources from the West which gave the unconditional 
surrender formula an evil appearance or made it seem as if it were 
unpopular with certain individuals in substantial positions. On one 
occasion David Viklund, London correspondent of Dagensynheter Viklund 
was quoted as saying: "London is earnestly discussing the problem 
whether the unconditional terms for Japan can be mildened [sic.] so that 
Japanese face can be kept, and the Allies will not suffer from enormous 
losses in the future.i151 
The Foreign Office suggested that the terms of the Allies should be 
released in full and that the only course for the government to take was 
48Kato, Lost War, pp. 233-34; and Kawai, 11 Mokusatsu, 11 p. 411. 
49Nippon Times, August 16, 1945, p. 2. 
50 Ibid. , August 1 , 1945, p. 3. 
51 Ibid., August 3, 1945, p. 3. 
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to say nothing at all. This essentially was Foreign Minister Togo's 
attitude, but, as noted, Suzuki's press statement dashed these hopes. 
Togo later stated in his memoirs that Japan was willing to accept the 
Potsdam Declaration unconditionally, but that was not to surrender 
unconditionally. Since the declaration of unconditional surrender 
applied only to the armed forces and not to the nation, officials 
thought that it offered considerable latitude. 52 Perhaps Japanese dip-
lomatists were willing to accept unconditional surrender as enunciated 
in the Declaration but wanted to have the appearance of a negotiated 
peace. 
Togo's intention in taking the post of Foreign Minister in the 
Suzuki cabinet was to work for peace and because it was generally known 
he opposed the war, Suzuki selected him. 53 As early as January, 1942, 
Togo had instructed his staff in the Foreign Office to study ways of 
ending the war and to prepare to "seize the chance" for peace when it 
came. He had even made his views on foreign policy known to the Diet, 
a risky position in a country where "thought-control" police were con-
stantly on the watch for deviant behavior. 54 To be inclined toward 
peace was one thing but to be willing to accept unconditional surrender 
was another--thi s Togo was not entirely ready to do. "There was no 
thought of unconditional surrender in this country. We were concerned 
with the steps to be taken to obtain suitable conditions; in other words 
how we could obtain a negotiated peace, 11 he stated on one occasion. 55 
52 Togo, Cause of Japan, p. 399; and Kato, Lost War, p. 233. 
53 Ibid., Po 282; and Jones, Japan's New Order, p. 216nl. 
54sutow, Decision to Surrender, pp. 8nl and 65n33. 
55 1bid., pp. 87n29 and 123. 
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And another time he called the Allied.position 11 illogical, unacceptable 
to the Japanese people, and a distortion of historical fact. 1156 
If the Japanese were not ready in July, 1945, to accept an uncon-
ditional surrender but were still looking to a negotiated peace, there 
was no problem in their minds as to what the principle and non-negotiable 
condition would be--the continuation of the ageless imperial system. 
56 Ibid., p. 40n31. 
CHAPTER III 
THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE JAPANESE EMPEROR AS A 
FACTOR IN UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER 
Defining the future position of the Japanese Emperor became the 
focal point for efforts to modify the unconditional surrender formula. 
As it became progressively clear that the Allies would win the war in 
the Pacific, efforts were made to explain to the Japanese as well as the 
Allied peoples what role he would play in an occupied Japan. 
Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew who had been United States 
ambassador to Japan (1932-41) was probably the most adamant for the 
continuation of the imperial system. Throughout the war Grew had 
opposed propaganda against the Emperor and questioned the wisdom of 
bombing the Emperor's palace. He felt that it would be difficult to 
secure the surrender of Japan without some undertaking by the President 
guaranteeing that unconditional surrender would not mean the elimina-
tion of the imperial dynasty. Grew, therefore, sent a memo to President 
Truman on May 28, 1945, putting forth his views. In this memo he noted 
that the greatest obstacle to unconditional surrender was the belief 
that it might mean the end of the imperial system. 1 Grew also gave the 
President a draft of a proposed proclamation to the Japanese which in 
1Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era,.! Diplomatic Record of Flrty 
Years, ed. Walter Johnson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 952), 
p. 1429. 
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many respects was similar to the Potsdam Declaration, but in one sig-
nif:icant detail it was different. The former ambassador proposed that 
the government of Japan might become a "constitutional monarchy. 112 
26 
Grew had attempted to clarify his position before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on December 12, 1944, by stating that he had never 
felt that the Emperor should be retained or eliminated after the war. 
He told the Committee that he believed that the problem should be left 
fluid. 3 It would seem that by May, 1945, his views had become somewhat 
altered. In a letter to Samuel Rosenman, Counsel to President Truman, 
on June 16, 1945, Grew contended for the right of the Japanese to deter-
mine their own political structure. Two days later, the President 
ruled against such a step but desired that the subject of the Emperor's 
status be entered on the agenda of the upcoming Potsdam Conference. 4 
The former Ambassador was supported in his views by several Asian 
experts who were advisors to him at the State Department: Eugene H. 
Dooman, formerly counselor of the American Embassy in Tokyo; Joseph W. 
Ballantine, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State 
Department; and George H. Blakeslee, Chairman of the Far Eastern Area 
Committee of the State Department. 5 All of these men had long connec-
tions with the State Department and Japanese relations. Dooman was 
born in Japan and had worked for the Department as an interpreter; 
Ballantine had also been an interpreter and had spent many years in 
2 Ibid. , p. 1433. 
3 Ibid., p. 1417. 
4Ibid., pp. 1435 and 1437. 
5 Ibid. , p. 1422. 
Japan; and Blakeslee was an expert in international relations who had 
taught and visited in Japan a number of times. It is interesting that 
Ellis M. Zacharias found Grew and his advisors determined to continue 
the war with Japan to its total defeat and to avoid any deals with the 
Emperor. 6 
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Under Secretary Grew believed that Secretary of War Stimson, 
Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, and General Marshall, Chief of Staff, 
U. S. Army, disagreed with him on the position of the Emperor. In a 
meeting at the Pentagon May 29, 1945, they discussed Grew's memo of the 
day before which noted the fear of the Japanese that unconditional sur-
render would mean the end of the imperial system. Marshall thought that 
pub 1 i cation of the statement at that time would be premature. 7 In the 
view of Stimson and his military advisors, it was necessary to consider 
that some of Japan's leaders would presume any conciliatory move as an 
indication of weakness. For this reason he did not support Grew on an 
immediate statement. 8 In regard to later statements of the Secretary, 
it appears that Stimson at first opposed the idea of retention, but by 
the time of the Potsdam Conference had changed his mind. In a memo to 
the President July 2, 1945, he stated that the·United States should not 
exclude the idea of constitutional monarchy. 9 Grew recognized that at 
6Ellis M. Zacharias, Secret Missions; the Story of an Intelligence 
Officer (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 19461':" p. 333. 
7Herbert Feis, Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the 
War in the Pacific {Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1961), p. 19. 
8Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace 
and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947}, p. 628. -
9Ibid., p. 623. 
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Potsdam Stimson worked energetically for a statement on the Emperor. 
While there Stimson spoke to Truman of the importance of reassuring the 
Japanese on the meaning of unconditional surrender. He desired an 
insertion on the point of the continuation of the Emperor in the formal 
warning statement, but when he heard that Byrnes preferred not to put 
it in, he hoped that the President might be willing to assure the 
Japanese verbally through diplomatic channels. 10 
At a State-War-Navy meeting May 28, 1945, Forrestal had asked if 
it would be sufficient to say that unconditional surrender concerned 
only the Japanese military and did not mean the destruction of the 
nation. Grew's advisor Dooman was of the opinion that it would not 
suffice since the Japanese were imbued with the idea that it meant the 
destruction of their philosophy of government. 11 This is not to imply 
that the Navy Secretary believed that the Emperor should be set aside, 
since Forrestal had early subscribed to Grew's notion that a decision 
on the Emperor should be deferred until a military occupation had been 
effected. At a State-War-Navy meeting June 26, 1945, he supported the 
draft that Grew had given President Truman in May. 12 Forrestal may 
have been influenced partically by his assistant, John J. McCloy, who 
10u. s. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam 
Conference~ (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), II, 
1272n3. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Potsdam, II. This was from a 
section of Stimson's diary dated July 24, 1945. 
11 walter Millis., ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1951), p. 66. -
12 rbid., pp. 53 and 71. Feis noted that at an earlier State-War-
Navy meeting June 12, 1945, Forrestal took up Grew's cause. The Navy 
Secretary was concerned about the relationship of the Japanese people to 
the Emperor. Feis, Japan Subdued, p. 19. 
thought the Japanese ought to be permitted to retain the Emperor, and 
Ellis M. Zacharias, a naval intelligence officer who prepared a plan 
for the Secretary, 11 A Strategic Pl an to Effect the Occupation of 
Japan, 11 emphasizing the importance of the imperial family-. 13 
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Admiral William Leahy, Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and 
Truman, was in agreement with the idea of maintaining the imperial 
system because of military reasons. He indicated that it was unwise to 
consider the execution of the Emperor as some advisors to the President 
desired. In his opinion it would mean a great loss of life if there 
was to be an invasion of the Japanese homeland; therefore, at the Pots-
dam Conference he wished there would be an explanation to the Japanese 
that unconditional surrender did not mean the destruction of their 
government. 14 Yet Leahy did not go so far as to support the Grew pro-
posal for a Japanese constitutional monarchy. As a spokesman for the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, he thought it wise to make no statement on the 
position of the Emperor at that time. 15 
The Foreign Morale Analysis Division (FMAD) of the Office of War 
Information made studies of Japanese morale during the war and found 
that Japanese attitudes toward the Emperor never weakened. Alexander H. 
Leighton, head of FMAD, has noted that in the winter and spring of 1945 
his analysts advised policy-makers against employing attacks on the 
13Millis, Forrestal Diaries, p. 71; Zacharias, Secret Missions, 
p. 337; and Robert Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 19541, p. 139n79. 
14wi11 i am D. Leahy, l Was There, the Personal Story of the Chief 
of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on.His Notes ·and 
Dfaries Made at the Time (New York: Whittlesey House,--;gso), pp.7ff8-19 
and 434.-- - - --
15FRUS, Pots dam, II , 1269. 
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Emperor or the imperial institution since it would have no psychological 
benefit and might in fact harden enemy resistance. He further felt 
that the United States should make it clear that it was not going to 
abolish the imperial household, but army and navy authorities felt that 
the time was not ripe for such a declaration. 16 
Those individuals who opposed the retention of the Emperor usually 
did so for one of two reasons. They either felt that he personified 
the myth of Japanese racial superiority, or they believed the American 
people would accept no modification of the unconditional doctrine as 
that would be tantamount to appeasement. James F. Byrnes who became 
Secretary of State to Truman in July, 1945, learned of the differences 
of opinion on the Japanese Emperor and took with him to Potsdam memos 
on the varying views. He seems to have been influenced by those who 
opposed imperial retention. 
Byrnes consulted with former Secretary of State Cordell Hull before 
Potsdam. The new Secretary of State wanted Hull's opinion on Grew's 
proposal for the maintenance of the Emperor. To Hull it sounded too 
much like appeasement. It not only seemed to guarantee continuance of 
the Emperor but also his feudal privileges and the privileges of a rul-
ing caste. 17 During his tenure Hull had dealt with the same problem 
and had concluded that the supreme authority in Japan would have to be 
the Allied military government. He decided that it would be best to 
make use of the Emperor so the military government could function 
16Alexander H. Leighton, Human Relations in!. Changing World 
(New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1949), pp. 55, 56, 130, 126 and 
229. 
17cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: MacMillan 
Company, 1948), p. 1594. - -
effectively. 18 Hull received a message from Byrnes ·on July 17, -1945, 
which stated that he agreed with Hull's statement that an announcement 
on the Emperor should be delayed. 19 
Assistant Secretary of State Archibald-MacLeish sent a memo to 
Byrnes July 6, 1945, and quoted an analysis made by the Department 
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June 13. This analysis noted that the Japanese, without exception, were 
for the preservation and the non-molestation of-the Emperor, and that 
these factors comprised "irreducible Japanese terms."· MacLeish recom-
mended that no public statement be made on the Emperor until there was 
further study by the State Department. 20 Another State Department 
position paper dated July 3, 1945, that Byrnes had with him at Potsdam 
noted the difficulty in abolishing the Emperorship. 21 
Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson appeared to have ·been one of 
Byrnes' advisors who desired the removal of the Emperor. In a memo 
from MacLeish to Byrnes July 6, 1945, MacLeish stated that Acheson had 
pointed out in a staff meeting that the institution of the Emperor was 
an II anachronistic, feuda 1 i nsti tuti on" ·easily manipulated by f euda 1-
mi nded groups. 22 Acheson thought that leavtng the throne intact was to 
run the risk that it would be used in the future as it had been in the 
past, as he saw the Emperor as a weak leader who had yielded to military 
18rbid., pp. 1591-93, ·from a memo dated May 9, 1944. 
19 rbid., pp. 1593-95. 
2DFRUS, Potsdam, I, 895-97. 
21 Ibid., pp. 885-87. 
22 Ibid., p. 896. 
demands for war and could not be relied upon. 23 Obviously it was this 
kind of thinking to which Zacharias referred when he noted· that he 
found in the State Department men who were avoiding any kind of deals 
with the Emperor. They failed to detect forces in Japan which were 
potentially or actually ready to talk peace. 24 
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One other advisor to Byrnes presented the view of oppos i-ti on to 
imperial retention. Secretary Forrestal was told by Grew July 6, 1945, 
that he feared his draft proposal might be ditched on the way to Potsdam 
by Charles E. Bohlen among others. Bohlen in particular might object 
because of his close association with the Russians and view a clarifi-
cation on the unconditional surrender formula as a desire to end the 
war before Russia had an opportunity to enter. 25 
There was some discussion on the issue in Congress. Senator Homer 
E. Capehart was the most outspoken in favor of retaining the Emperor. 
He thought that if the retention of the Emperor was for "face-saving" 
on the part of the Japanese, he was willing to accept it. Moreover he 
did not accept the philosophy that the Japanese would not consider them-
selves beaten until the Emperor was removed. 26 His views were known to 
the Japanese and were welcomed by those working for peace. 27 Senator 
23oean Acheson, Present at the Creation; & Years in the State 
Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969J,pp. 112-13. 
24zacharias, Secret Missions, p. 333. 
25Millis, Forrestal Diaries,.pp. 73-74. 
26u. s. Congress. Senate. Remarks of Homer E. Capehart, "Terms 
of Surrender for Japan. 11 79th Cong., 1st sess. , July 12, 1945. Con-
gress i ona 1 Record, XCI, 7438. 
27Kase Toshikazu, Journey to the Missouri (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1950), p. 199. 
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Elbert D. Thomas of Utah, a former Mormon missionary to Japan {1907-
1912), who aided in the psychological warfare aimed at the Japanese, 
believed it would be the wisest policy to retain the Emperor. 28 Yet as 
early as 1943 there was a desire by some that the Emperor be severed 
from a position in any future government. Representative Warren 
Magnuson of Washington in November, 1943, supported an article by Dr. 
B. A. Liu of the Chinese News Service entitled "The Mikado Must Go." 
This article called for Hirohito's removal and even advocated-trying 
him as a war criminal. 29 Other senators toward the end of the war would 
agree that the Emperor should not retain his sovereignty and perhaps 
not even his nominal position. 30 It is interesting, however, that in 
Congress the man who had had personal experience in Japan was committed 
to the idea of imperial retention. 
At the Potsdam Conference the group which opposed any mention of 
the Emperor had its way, as the final communique made no statement on 
his future status. However, this was not the last attempt to get some 
statement of a positive nature on the Emperor. During the final days of 
the Pacific war when the Japanese were negotiating for a peace settle-
ment, there were high level discussions in Washington on altering the 
unconditional surrender policy to allow for the retention of the 
Emperor. 
28New York Times, August 11, 1945, p. 8. 
29u. S. Congress. House. Extension of Remarks of Warren Magnuson, 
"The Mikado Must Go," taken from an article by Dr. B. A. Liu in the 
Chinese News Service. 78th Cong., 1st sess., November 9, 1943. Con-
gress i ona 1 Record,. LXXXIX, A4756-58. 
30Among them could be found Senators Brien McMahon {D-Conn.), Tom 
Stewart {D-Tenn.), Richard Russell (D-Ga.), William Langer {R-N.D.), and 
Joseph Ball {R-Minn. ). New York Times, August 11, 1945, p. 8. 
In the early morning hours of August 10, 1945, the United States 
received through the Swiss government a message from Japan that they 
were ready to accept the Potsdam Declaration "with the understanding 
that said Declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices 
34-. 
the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.·~ Admiral Leahy 
urged immediate acceptance since he felt it would be necessary to use 
Hirohito in effecting the surrender. Stimson also contended for 
acceptance of the proposal as he observed along with Leahy the impor-
tance of continuing the Emperor in order to get to surrender the many 
scattered armies of the Japanese who would "own no other authority. 1131 
Byrnes disagreed. He could not see why the United States should retreat 
from its policy of unconditional surrender. He reasoned that it should 
be the United States who set conditions, not Japan. He also pointed 
out that it would be necessary to get the assent of the British and the 
Russians who had signed the Potsdam Declaration with the idea of con-
ditional surrender and that would cause delay. 32 Truman agreed with 
Byrnes since he also felt that the government should not reverse itself 
too sharply from the unconditional formula. 33 The reply34 was 
31 James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1947), p. 209; Leahy, l Was There, p. 434; and Stimson, On Active Ser-
vice, p. 627. There was some discussion over the definition of-the 
term 11 sovereign. 11 If it meant he was only to be a titular head, it 
might be acceptable, but if it meant "power of self-determination," the 
opposition would be more vigorous. New York Times, August 11, 1945, 
p. 3. 
32syrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 209; and Byrnes , A 11 in One Life-
ti me (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 3os·. 
33Harry s. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I, Year of Decisions_ (Garden ~ity, 
New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955), p. 428; and Stimson, On Active 
Service, p. 626. 
3411 From the moment of surrender, the authority of the Emperor and 
ambiguous. While it showed that the Emperor was to have no power, 
which had been true for some time anyway, he was to remain in his 
position at least to effect the surrender. 
35 
It has been suggested that the absence of any mention of the 
Emperor in the Potsdam Declaration posed a serious problem for those in 
Japan who were trying to bring the war to an end. Those individuals 
were especially hampered since the preservation of the imperial house 
had been the basis of their efforts. 35 
Kido Koichi, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, was one of those who 
felt that the "high aim" of getting Japan out of the war was to retain 
the Emperor's status. 36 It is interesting though that a notation in 
Kido 1 s diary January 6, 1944, completely overlooked this point. When 
considering the steps that should be taken by Japan if Germany col-
lapsed, he listed five points as a basis for negotiation without men-
tioning the fate of the Emperor. 37 Perhaps he felt it was such an 
obvious condition that he need not even note it. 
In a statement drafted on February 13, 1945, to be given to the 
the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied powers ••• 
"The Emperor wi 11 be required to authorize and ensure -the si gna-
ture by the government of Japan and the Japanese Imperial General Head-
quarters of the surrender terms ... and to issue such other orders as the 
Supreme Commander may require .. . 
"The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance 
with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed 
wi 11 of the people. 11 Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 309-10. 
35sutow, Decision to Surrender, p. 140. 
36 I bi d . , p. 11 3. 
371nternational Military Tribunals, Far East: Kido's Diary, pp. 
31071-73, hereafter referred to as IMTFE; and Kase, Journey to the 
Missouri, pp. 130-31. 
36 
Emperor, Prince Konoye and Yoshida Shigeru, confidant to several influ-
ential Japanese officials, noted that British and American opinion had 
not at that time gone to the length of contemplating making changes in 
the Japanese political structure. 38 It is surprising that even as late 
as February, 1945, two well-informed members .of the Japanese·government 
did not realize the place of the unconditional surrender policy as the 
sole formula for ending the war. Others were more realistic. 
Col. Matsutani Makota in the spring of 1944 was in charge of a 
planning unit called Group 20. In a position paper entitled "Measures 
for the Termination of the Greater East Asia War, 11 this group declared 
that Japan should end the war with only the guarantee that the "national 
polity" (kokutai or essentially the Emperor) be safeguarded. These were 
the minimum terms; everything else might have to be sacrificed. 39 The 
reason behind such a proposal might have been Japan's continued military 
defeats·. Matsutani and the members of Group 20 from the General Staff 
would be keenly aware of Japan's fading military might. 
The Japanese ambassador to the Soviet Union, Sato Naotake, decided 
in mid-July, 1945, that his government should accept the Allied surren-
der demands (at this time based on the Potsdam Declaration) providing 
that it could get some guarantee on the future of the Emperor. He put 
forth his views in a message to Foreign Minister Togo who replied that 
Sato should try to use the good offices of the Soviet Union to obtain 
peace terms short of unconditional surrender. What Togo desired was a 
38Yoshi da Shi geru, The Yoshida Memoirs: the Story of Japan in 
Crisis, trans. Yoshida Kenichi (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), 
p. 25 
39sutow, Decision to Surrender, pp. 26-27; and Lester Brooks, 
Behind Japan's Surrender(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 122-23. 
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positive definition of the term, especially as it affected the Emperor's 
role in the government. 40 
It was Premier Suzuki, probably more than any other, who felt that 
the institution must be left undisturbed. Suzuki had acted as an 
advisor to the Emperor in his early years, and a close relationship had 
grown up between the two, so it came as no surprise when Suzuki in a 
statement to the Diet April, 1945, stressed the importance of the 
imperial position. Again in June Suzuki indicated his loyalty to the 
Emperor when he stated: 11 Uncondi tional surrender wi 11 only mean that our 
national structure ... will be destroyed. 1141 Unconditional surrender 
would remain unacceptable to the old Premier as long as he associated it 
with the dissolution of the imperial house. 
At the meetings of the Supreme Council for the Direction for the 
War during the final days of the war, the question of the Emperor's 
future status became a paramount issue. Even those Japanese officials 
who supported a peace movement with virtually unconditional terms were 
concerned about the Emperor's future situation, while those Japanese who 
favored a 11 fight-to-the-death 11 made the Emperor's status the principal 
issue, thereby hoping to forestall surrender. 
When the Supreme Council met the morning of August 9, Togo stated 
that the Potsdam Declaration had to be complied with, but conditionally; 
that is, he demanded the "preservation of the National polity [the 
40sutow, Decision to Surrender, pp. 130, 131, 149, and 159n24. 
41 zacharias, Secret Missions, p. 370; and Brooks, Behind Japan's 
Surrender, p. 31. 
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Emperor] as the indispensable condition of acceptance. 1142 He rei.terated 
this single condition throughout the Supreme Council and cabinet meet-
ings of the next two days. In the cabinet six were for the sole reser-
vation on the Emperor, three were for additional inclusions, and five 
were neutral but seemed to favor a reduction in the number of condi-
tions.43 At the late night meeting of the Supreme Council August 9, 
Suzuki took an unprecedented step by calling for an imperial decision. 
The Emperor himself made the final decision for surrender. After the 
conference Baron Hiranuma suggested the wording of the reservation 
statement that was to be sent to the United States.~4 The phrase 
originally to be used might have been more acceptable to the Allies 
according to Butow. It read: "on the understanding that it [the Potsdam 
Declaration] did not include any demand for a change in the status of 
the Emperor under the national laws. 1145 
The Supreme Council received Byrnes' reply46 on August 13. The 
wording of the reply caused a renewal of the controversy over the 
Emperor's status. Togo feared outside interference with the institu-
tion but worked to have the reply accepted. The Foreign Minister 
interpreted the phrase "subject to" in a more acceptable way by defining 
42Togo Shigenori, The Cause of Japan, trans. and ed. Togo Fumihiko 
and Ben Bruce Blakeney (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), pp. 316-17. 
43Butow, Decision to Surrender, p. 170. See Chapter IV for 
details. -
4411with the understanding that said declaration does not comprise 
any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sover-
eign Ruler." Kase, Journey to the Missouri, pp. 130-31. 
45Butow, Decision to Surrender, p. 137 and 173nl6. 
46see above p. 34, note 34. 
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it II restricted by" rather than "subordinate to. 1147 Togo al so had to 
deal with a problem in the Foreign Office over the correct translation 
of the term 11 government 11 which had been decoded "the Government. 11 The· 
farmer was considered as referring to the nati ona 1 po 1 i ty whi 1 e the 
1 atter meant only the administration without any connection to the 
Emperor. After some deliberation, experts in the Foreign Office finally 
agreed that it did not include the Emperor. 48 The term was probably 
given this interpretation because of Togo's desire for peace. 
The members of the Supreme Council who wanted to continue the war 
used the principle of imperial preservation as a stopgap against peace 
moves. Minister of War General Anami Korechika, Army Chief of Staff 
Umezu Yoshijiro, and Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda Soemu outlined four 
conditions for acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the Emperor's 
pennanence being the fundamental condition. 49 They were aroused by 
Byrnes' reply as they thought it would mean the end of the Emperor, so 
they proposed to send another note to the Allies that specified that 
the Emperor would not be under the control of the Allied Supreme 
Command. 50 
The failure of the Supreme Council to come to a decision on 
47Togo, Cause of Japan, p. 326; and Butow, Decision to Surrender, 
p. 201 • 
48sutow, Decision to Surrender, p. 198. 
49 Kase, Journey to the Missouri, p. 231 ; and Shigemitsu Manoru, 
Japan and Her Destiny; ~ Struggle for Peace, trans. Oswa 1 d White, ed. 
Major General F.S.G. Piggott (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 
1958) , p. 359. 
5
°Kato Masuo, The Lost War; !, Japanese Reporter's Inside Story. 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 238; F. C. Jones, Japan's New 
Order in East Asia; its Rise and Fall 1937-45, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1954'f,P-:-447. --
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Byrnes I reply made it necessary for the Emperor again to make the -final 
decision in a hurriedly called Imperial Conference August 14. The 
Emperor accepted the Byrnes reply as the Foreign Office had reconunended 
and commanded that it be accepted by the unwilling members of the 
Council and the cabinet. 51 
If the American government had made a formal statement to the 
effect that surrender would not mean Hirohito's elimination, could the 
war have been brought to an earlier conclusion? This was the primary 
question looming over the future status of the Emperor. Former Ambas-
sador Grew felt that if the President had issued the reconunended state-
ment in May, there might have been an earlier peace settlement. 52 
Stimson, who also took a conciliatory view on the question of the 
Emperor, concluded that the United States might be found guilty of pro-
longing the war by delaying in stating its position on the Emperor. 53 
It is clear that as far as the Japanese were concerned, no satis-
factory statement was ever made on the Emperor. It is quite possible 
if the United States had published a statement, even as ambiguous as 
Byrnes' final reply, with the implication of imperial continuation, the 
Supreme Council might have acquiesced to "unconditional surrender." 
There seems to have been several occasions when the United States 
could have used the opportunity for making a statement on the Emperor. 
51 Butow, Decision to Surrender, pp. 194, 194nl3, and 206. See also 
Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, p. 362. 
52 Grew, Turbulent Era, p. 1428. See above pp. 25 and 26 for Grew's 
proposal. -
53st · 0 A . S . 6 1mson, n ct,ve erv,ce, p. 29. 
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Zacharias referred to a report in December, 1944, that stated a formula 
could be worked out for peace if unconditional surrender could be 
modified to permit re ten ti on of the Emperor. 54 Butow found it di ffi cult 
to understand why the Togo-Sato messages regarding the Emperor did not 
have a greater impact on the United States' policy toward the imperial 
system. 55 Byrnes can be blamed more than any other person in this 
respect. He was undoubtedly influenced by Hull, and it is fairly certain 
that he had made up his mind that no statement on the Emperor should be 
released at the Potsdam Conference--the most likely place to seize the 
opportunity for revision. Byrnes' final reply clearly showed Hull's 
influence, as the type of government eventually planned for Japan was 
larqely as Hull had earlier outlined. 56 
Hanson Baldwin, military affairs editor for the New York Times, 
has been one of the severest critics of United States wartime policy. 
He asserted that the Japanese could have surrendered had the Potsdam 
Declaration included a promise to permit the Emperor to remain. 57 It 
is interesting that during the war Baldwin felt a strong case was being 
made by those who wanted the Emperor removed. He called Hirohito the 
symbol of the system that bore responsibility for the war and hinted 
that he should be dethroned. 58 Other individuals more acquainted with 
54zacharias, Secret Missions, p. 335. 
55Butow, Decision to Surrender, p. 135. 
56see above p. 30 for Hull's proposals. 
57Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of~ War (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1949), p. 92. 
58New York Times, August 6, 1945, p. 3; and New York Times, 
August ,-,; 1945, p. 4. 
Orienta 1 thought rea 1 i zed that al though the Emperor was a symbol, he 
was an es sen ti al and cherished symbol. Moreover, the imperial system 
was essentially passive; it would be foolish to destroy it, especially 
since the Emperor would be necessary to hold up a new regime. 59 
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In examining the Japanese decision to surrender, one realizes that 
no foo 1 proof answer can be given on the effect of American ref us a 1 to 
state positively the Emperor's future position. Some have held to the 
idea that ; f the United States had hedged on unconditional surrender by 
permitting the imperial system to continue, the civilian members of the 
Japanese government would have ordered a cessation of hos ti 1 i ti es. 60 On 
the other hand, United States officials could only believe what had been 
true to them for some time: that the Emperor was controlled by the 
military, and any statement would not aid the peace group since the 
militarists still had the power to dissolve cabinets and replace peace-
minded i ndi vi duals with men determined to "fight-to-the-death. 11 
In the final analysis indecision before the Potsdam Conference and 
inertia in the fi na 1 days of the war worked in a way that American 
leaders hedged on any firm commitment to the Emperor's future role. 
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the Japanese would have surrendered 
sooner because of the military's control of the decision-making process 
and the inability or unwillingness to correctly interpret the leniency 
of unconditional surrender. 
59M. Searle Bates and Kenneth Scott Latourette, "The Future of 
Japan- -an American View, 11 Pacific Affairs, XVII (June, 1944), p. 192. 
60sutow, Decision to Surrender, p. 123; and Stimson, On Active 
Service, p. 628. -
CHAPTER IV 
THE MODIFICATION AND FINAL ACCEPTANCE OF 
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER 
In view of the dissension over the unconditional formula, it should 
not be surprising that repeated efforts were made to have the policy 
modified. Not only were some worried about the failure of the govern-
ment to take a definite stand on the Emperor's future status, but others 
felt that the policy would have a harmful impact on groups in Japan who 
favored peace. 
Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, a naval intelligence officer during the 
war, desired changes that would make unconditional surrender acceptable 
to the Japanese government. He made Japanese language broadcasts-in 
an attempt to influence those Japanese leaders who had the power to 
continue the war or accept unconditional surrender and who had access 
to transcripts of his broadcasts. 1 When Zacharias first heard of the 
Pearl Harbor attack, he realized the need for "psychological as ·well as 
physical attack 11 to win the war in the Pacific. 2 He was- surprised upon 
his arrival in Washington, February, 1945, that policymakers in the War 
and Navy Departments and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff were victims of 
Japanese propaganda. He noted that even the Office of War Information 
1Ellis M. Zacharias, Secre~ Missions: The Story of!!!. Intelligence 
Officer (New York: G. P. Putnam s Sons, l 946T,'9 p. 359. 
2 Ibid. , p. 304. 
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felt the Japanese resistance was still strong and that the Japanese 
were not open to psychological attacks. 3 
44 
The Captain proposed a plan, Operation Plan 1-45, which was to 
explain the meaning of unconditional surrender to the Japanese .people. 
His idea was to conduct an intensive psychological campaign against the 
Japanese high command in order to effect the unconditional surrender of 
Japan without the necessity of a landing on the main islands. He 
further proposed to explain that the unconditional doctrine was only a 
military term that meant the cessation of hostilities and yielding of 
arms rather than the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese 
people. 4 
Zacharias was given the assignment by Secretary Forrestal through 
the influence of Elmer Davis, head of the Office of War Information, 
and made his first broadcast VE Day, May 8, 1945. In this broadcast 
he read President Truman I s statement that·" •.• our blows wi 11 not cease 
until the Japanese military and naval forces [italics mine] lay down 
their arms in unconditional surrender. Just what does the unconditional 
surrender of the armed forces [italics mine] mean for the Japanese 
people? 115 It is noteworthy that not the Japanese people or even the 
Japanese government, but only the armed forces were to surrender uncon-
ditionally. This was one phase in a movement to alter the unconditional 
3Ibid., pp. 332 and 3340 Alexander Leighton, head of FMAD, also 
found this to be true. He noted in March, 1944, that there were many 
men in top positions who felt that Japanese morale was a solid wall of 
strength. Human Relations .in.~ Changing World {New York: E. P. Dutton 
and Company, 1959), pp. 46-47. 
4rbid., pp. 344-45. See also his broadcasts of May 19, 1945, and 
June 9, 1945, in Ibid., pp. 403 and 410. 
5 I bi d . , p • 401. 
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po 1 icy. Further efforts to a 1 ter the policy centered on the position of 
the Emperor. as other endeavors proved futile. In-subsequent-broadcasts 
he continued to stress that the formula did not mean enslavement -and 
that in American hands it would be a "humanitarian gesture of great 
constructive value. 116 
Despite his work Zacharias concluded that there was need for fur-
ther clarification of the concept. He agreed with a Naval psychological 
warfare group, OP-16-W, which found the term to be a contradiction 
since surrender was a condition in itself, and that the Japanese were 
using the formula for their own propaganda efforts, thereby forcing the 
~nited States to take a defensive position. 7 His broadcasts-no doubt 
were effective as a relative of the Emperor, Prince Takamatsu, stated 
after the war that his messages had provided ammunition for the peace 
party to win out. Kase Toshikazu, an officer in the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry and personal secretary to Foreign Minister Togo also acknow-
ledged the importance of the broadcasts. 8 
It was at Potsdam that major efforts were made to have the policy 
modified. Of course, the principal issue was the future position of the 
Emperor but, as earlier noted, no definite decision was ever reached. 
When it became clear that the policy would continue under President 
Truman, the idea developed to give the formula a less frightening 
appearance. Zacharias had been one part of the redefining project. The 
Potsdam Declaration was to be another part. 
61bid., p. 419. 
7Ibid., p. 377. 
8rbid., p. 375; and Kase Toshikazu, Journey to the Missouri {New 
Haven: Yale Univers·ity Press, 1950), p. 202. 
The primary function of the Potsdam Conference was to issue a 
joint statement on the treatment of Japan at the end of the war.· In a 
briefing paper for the Conference, drafted possibly by the State ·and 
War Departments, certain proposals were made so the Japanese might be 
better informed on the precise meaning of unconditional surrender. It 
was felt that a statement on Allied aims would tend to le~sen Japanese 
fear of the unknown element in unconditional surrender. The proposed 
s ta temen t might a 1 so he 1 p to create a conflict in Japan between II die-
h a rd militarists and those who wish to end the war, 11 and weaken 
Japanese propaganda with its malicious approach to the policy. 9 
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Secretary of State Stimson stated prior to the Potsdam Conference 
of July, 1945, that the "principal political, social and military 
objective of the United States in the summer of 1945 was-the prompt-and 
complete surrender of Japan. 1110 Yet in a memo to the President dated 
July 2, 1945, the Secretary, in trying to find an alternative to the 
forceful occupation of Japan, suggested warning them of what was due to 
come (the atomic bomb?) and giving them a chance to capitulate. He 
further felt that their government was wise enough to accept uncondi-
ti ona 1 surrender. 11 
At a Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting in June, also before the Con-
ference, questions arose that were related to the whole course of future 
operations necessary to bring an end to the war. But it was not until 
9u. s. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
Diplomatic Papers. The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 
(Washington, D. c.: Government Printing Office:-T960), I, 884. 
1 0Hen ry L. st i ms on and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace 
and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 617. -
11 Ibid., pp. 621-22; and FRUS, Potsdam, I, 890-92. 
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the end of the meeting that someone--unknown--suggested that a poli ti ca 1 
attempt be made to end the war. Perhaps this is not surprising in a 
meeting composed primarily of military men, but it has been purported 
that this showed the habit of wartime policy-making to confine-.large 
questions on the conduct of the war to purely military considerations. 12 
After this meeting a paper was drawn up which embodied essentially what 
was used in the Potsdam communique. Assistant Secretary of War John J. 
McCl oy reasoned that if preparation of this document had been better, 
wi th p ropes a 1 s such as were actually put into effect in Japan after the 
war, that Japanese surrender might have been induced. 13 
The actual declaration was released at Potsdam on July 26, 1945, 
14 
and was 1 a rge ly the work of Stimson, Dooman, Grew and Byrnes. 
Acheson later declared that the statement disturbed him, as he feared 
it would cost the Allies the opportunity for complete victory over 
Japan. He regarded it as not the desired ultimatum but an i nvi tati on 
which might lead the United Nations into a trap. He had the feeling 
that the war might end inconclusively with the Japanese military still 
in contro1. 15 
In a State Department memo prepared by the Office of Far Eastern 
12John J. Mccloy, The Challenge to American Foreign Policy 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 40-42. 
13Ibid., p. 43; and Leahy, l Was There, p. 383. Robert Butow 
credited McCloy along with Grew and Forrestal for efforts to promote a 
definition of unconditional surrender that the Japanese could accept. 
Decision to Surrender, p. 139n79. 
14Lester Brooks, Behind Japan's Surrender (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1968) , p. 158. 
15
oean Acheson, Present at the Creation: & Years in the State 
Department (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969},p. 113. 
Affairs, July 30, the traditional policies of the Department toward 
unconditional surrender were noted. The department viewed the policy 
as "contemplating a unilateral surrender with no contractual elements 
whatever, 11 but the memo noted that if the Deel arati on were accepted as 
written, it could be interpreted to come under international law. 16 
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The proclamation significantly called for the unconditional surrender of 
the "Japanese armed forces II rather than the Japanese government. This 
was a meaningful alteration since the department up to that time had 
interpreted the uncondi ti ona 1 formula 11as applying to Japan, thus cover-
ing not only the armed forces, but also the emperor, the government, and 
the peop 1 e. 11 1 7 At the Potsdam Conference then, the change in po 1 icy 
used by President Truman and broadcast to the Japanese by Zacharias 
f"1ay 8 was put into the official communique. The efforts of the men who 
wanted further modification of the policy, such as Zacharias or McCloy, 
were disregarded. The formula stood with only a slight alteration •. 
A question remains on why the policy was not made even more con~·-.·;_·. 
ciliatory when the American delegation learned that the Japanese had 
initiated peace feelers through Russia. The Japanese hoped to arrive at 
some settlement short of unconditional surrender by using the then 
neutral Russians as mediators. They even were willing to send one of 
their ablest representatives, Prince Konoye, to the Soviet Union but 
found themselves rebuffed on attempted meetings with Russian Foreign 
Minister Molotov. When Stalin mentioned the peace feelers to Byrnes 
during the Conference, the Marshal gave Secretary Byrnes the impression 
16 FRUS, Potsdam, II , 1284-85. 
17Ibid. 
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that he was not anxious to see the war end before Russia could obtain 
concessions in China. 18 Harry Hopkins, a special adviser to the 
President, in a cable to Truman in May also noted the peace maneuvers, 
but Stalin's intention was to go through with unconditional surrender. 
The Marshal suggested using milder terms, but at war's end "to give 
them the works. 1119 Nevertheless Stalin had said that the last message 
to him by the Japanese was that they would fight to the death rather 
than accept unconditional surrender. 20 Ostensibly the declaration might 
have been relaxed with the knowledge of these peace maneuvers in the 
hope the Japanese might yield without the necessity of an Allied inva-
sion. Actually it had almost the reverse effect, since it stimulated 
the Allies to impress upon all Japanese leaders the hopelessness of 
their situation. 21 
It was not to frighten the Japanese into submission-but rather, as 
President Truman stated, "It was to spare the Japanese public from utter 
destruction. 1122 Stimson felt it was-important to emphasize the double 
character of the declaration, since it was designed to promise 
18James F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1958), p. 290. 
19sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 903-_4 •. 
20James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1947), p. 262. Acting Secretary of.State Grew made a statement on 
Japanese peace offers, July 10, 1945, and viewed them as "familiar 
weapons of psychological warfare and will be used as such by the Japan-
ese." U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, XIII {July 15, 1945), 
Joseph Grew, "Concerning Japanese Peace Offers, 11 p. 84. 
21 stimson, On Active Service, p. 629. 
22Leahy, ·l Was There, p. 432. 
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"destruction if Japan resisted, and hope, if she surrendered. 1123 
In spite of Zacharias' broadcasts, President Truman's message of 
May 8 and the apparent modification at Potsdam, the unconditional 
formula remained to a 1 arge part of the Japanese establishment a "dread 
and mysterious tenn1124 which would be used by some of them as a pretext 
for continuing the war to a fight-to-the-death struggle. If it was 
intended to create within the Japanese hierarchy a conflict between 
peace supporters and mi 1 i tary "di ehards, 11 then the Potsdam Deel arati on 
accomplished one of its functions. After Potsdam the dichotofJ\Y which 
had been forming over the continue-the-war issue hardened into two 
factions which heatedly debated the question of surrender in the final 
days of the war. 
ine group that was working in Japan for some sort of accommodation 
to the uncondi ti ona 1 formula has become known as the "peace party. 11 
Generally they were former cabinet members or high-ranking officials 
from the foreign office. Although these persons were working to end the 
war and were ready to accept unconditional surrender, usually with the 
sole reservation on the Emperor's future status, they wanted to give the 
appearance of a negotiated peace. 25 The primary and most influential 
members of the peace party were: Wakatsuki Reijiro, Premier in 1931; 
Okada Keisuke, Premier 1934-35; Prince Konoye Fumimaro, diplomat and 
Premier 1937-39 and 1940-41; and Marquis Kida Koichi, Lord Keeper of the 
Privy Seal, who functioned as personal adviser to the Emperor. These 
23stimson, On Active Service, p. 624. 
24zacharias, Secret Missions, p. 380. 
25 Kase, Journey to the Missouri, p. 203. 
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senior advisers began as early as 1943 to have private and secret meet-
1 ngs to dis cuss means to ending the war. 26 They hoped to find some 
go-between to reach a negotiated settlement with the Allies, but as 
seen in their attempts through the Soviet Union, their activities proved 
futile. 
Early in 1943 Konoye had initiated meetings with Wakatsuki and 
Okada; the focal point of their discussions had been on-how to terminate 
hostilities. 27 Okada kept Marquis Matsudaira Yasumasa, Kido's private 
secretary, informed of their talks so the senior statemen's feelings 
would be understood by the Lord Keeper and subsequently reach the 
Emperor. Besides Matsudaira there were others of the secretarial staff 
who were clandestinely working for peace and helped to prepare the way 
for surrender. Among them can be counted Colonel Matsutani, Suzuki's 
secretary; Admiral Takagi, representative of Navy Minister Yonai; and 
Kase Toshikazu, secretary to Togo. Their secrecy was not foolproof as 
seen in Matsudaira's dismissal in May, 1945. He was forced out by the 
arll\Y, largely because he was considered too much of an Anglophile. 
This group did important behind-the-scenes work in keeping the various 
peace advocates advised of one another's position. 28 
26 Ibid., p. 177; Shigemitsu Manoru, Japan~ Her Destiny;~ 
Struggle for Peace, trans. Oswald White, ed. MaJor General F.S.G. 
Piggott (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1958), p. 336; Mark 
Gayn, Japan Diary (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948), p. 
280; and Yale Candee Maxon, Control of Ja~anese Foreign Policy,!. ¥tudy 
of Civil-Military Rivalry, 1930-1945\Ber eley: University of Cali ornia 
Press , 19 5 7 ) , p . 1 9 O . 
27sutow, Decision to Surrender, pp. 16 and 16n26. 
28F. C. Jones, Japan 1s New Order in East Asia; its Rise and Fall, 
1937-45 (New York: Oxford University Press';l9's'4}: p-:---ir32; Butow ,-
Decision to Surrender, p. 83n20; Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, 
p. 334; and Kase, Journey to the Missouri, p. 206. - -
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Kida Koichi was one of the most adamant in his desire-for peace, 
yet at times was unrealistic in his views of peace settlement. At a 
meeting with his secretary, Matsudaira, January 6, 1944, he mentioned 
conditions under which Japan might be wi 11 i ng to surrender -should Ger-
many fal 1. These terms consisted mainly of land concessions. When he 
subsequently related his ideas to Shigemitsu Manoru, Foreign Minister 
during the Koiso Cabinet, the Lord Keeper found his ideas were not well 
accepted. Shigemitsu had by this time taken a more realistic view of 
the war and realized that nothing but practically unconditional surren-
der would be obtainable. Even as late as June 8, 1945, Kido was draft-
; ng a ten ta ti ve p 1 an for peace with substantially the same concessions 
for ending the war as his proposal in January. 29 
-i o make his p 1 ans for peace workab 1 e the Lord Keeper ca 11 ed on 
Suzuki, Togo, and Yanai on June 13 to obtain their re~ctions to his 
plan. Surprisingly he found each of the men in general agreement with 
his proposals but unaware of the others' feelings on the subject. 30 
This leads one to believe that it was only after the Potsdam Declaration 
that determined and coordinated efforts were made to accept surrender. 
It was in a new high-level council organized in August, 1944, that 
the peace party hoped to convince the leaders unwilling to surrender of 
the urgent need for peace. The Supreme Council for the Direction of the 
War, as ; t was cal led, was composed of six members who in the Suzuki 
29 rnternational Military Tribunals, Far East: Kido's Diary, pp. 
31071-73 and 31147-51, hereafter referred to as IMTFE.. Butow, Decision 
to Surrender, pp. 18, 24-26, and 25n45. Shigemitsu noted plans of this 
sort by Kido as early as May, 1943. Japan and Her Destiny, p. 300. 
30 rMTFE, pp. 31153-54; and Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, 
p. 356. 
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Cabinet included: Premier Suzuki, Foreign Minister Togo; War Minister 
Anami Korechika, Navy Minister Yonai -Mitsumasa, ·Army Chief of Staff 
Umezu Yoshijiro, and Navy Chief of Staff .Toyoda Soemu . .- This limitation 
to six members was 1 a rge ly the work of the peace advocates, s i nee they 
felt their chances of bringing an end to the war would be better in a 
small group. 31 
Unfortunately for the efforts of .the peace party, the early work of 
the Supreme Council did not point toward peace. At~ meeting June 6, 
1945, a decision was made to prosecute the war fully, _regardless of .the 
difficulties. Togo, who was unaware of the meeting -until just before 
it was called, was surprised at this development and especially Suzuki's· 
acceptance of the army's position. 32 It is interesting that at this 
meeting the military secretariat -was a·lso involved along with some other 
cabinet ministers. Often when a large number was present it was diffi-
cult for one to speak against the majority opinion. Perhaps this was 
the reason for Suzuki's action, plus the fact, according to Togo,. that 
the Premier did not place a great deal of importance on documents.-33 At 
another meeting June 18, 1945, the members decided that resistance 
should be continued as long as unconditional surrender was demanded. 
Yet there were proposals to begin peace negotiations -through Russia with 
31 Butow, Decision to Surrender, p. 37n27; Kase, Journey to the 
Missouri , p. 145; Maxon, Contro 1 of Japanese Foreign Po 1 icy, ·pp. 792-93; 
and Togo Shigenori, The Cause of Japan, trans. and ed. Togo Fumihiko 
and Ben Bruce Blakeney (New York: Simon and Schuster, ·1956), :p. 283. 
32Kase, Journey to the Missouri, p. 172; and Togo, Cause of Japan, 
pp. 291-94. 
33Maxon, Control of Japanese.Foreign Policy, p. 200; Togo, Cause of 
Japan, p. 291-94, and Brooks, Behind Japan's Surrender, p. 142. 
54 
a view to terminating the war by September, 1945. 34 
One of the chief prob 1 ems was that the Supreme Counci 1 did not work 
on the basis of majority rule but on unanimity, or more preci-sely 
general agreement and unity. Also,· its decisions· were not final until·_ 
ratified by the ful 1 cabinet. 35 This necessity for unity-_made it diffi-
cult for the supporters of peace since the Council was usually split 
three to three: Suzuki, Togo, and Yonai for peace, usually with the 
single condition; Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda for continuation of the war. 
Whereas the militarists were able to dissolve cabinets, it was necessary. 
for the former three to take steps toward peace cautiously.36 
At the same time the peace party was working through the Supreme 
Council to find the solutions to end the war, .there was a group of 
militarists who favored its continuation. The principal argument 
between the two groups was the desire on the part of the militarists to 
have one last fight to prove their worth and possibly strengthen 
Japan's negotiating position. The peace group, of course, wanted. to 
begin negotiations at once, i.e. at least after the issuance of the 
Potsdam Declaration.· Those who supported a fight-to-the~death empha-
sized the "spirit of Japan" even after _it b~came apparent the nation 
34Togo, Cause of Japan, p. 296; and Kase, Journey to the Missouri, . 
p. 184. 
35Butow, Decision to Surrender, pp. 38 and 38n29; and United States, 
Strategic Bombing Su-~ve~, Japa~'s Strugfe to End the.war (Washington, 
D. C.: Government Pr1nt1ng Office, 1946, p. 4. _ Hereafter referred to 
as USSBS, Japan's Struggle. 
36This was forcefully brought home to the -jushin on April 5, 1945, 
during a discussion on whether to.accept unconditional surrender _or not. 
Tojo who became a member of this group on the dissolution of his cabinet 
gave a grim reminder of the military's power to break up a cabinet. 
Butow, Decision to Surrender, pp. 60-61 and 60nll. 
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was defeated. 37 
The principle of ringisei, the control of the upper echelons by 
lower administrators, was effective in controlling decisions on endi.ng 
the war unti 1 the Supreme Council began to meet in more private sessions 
with only the major six cabinet members present. 38 This is perhaps one 
reason why the 11 Fundamental Policy" of June 6, 1945, was issued. The 
secretaries for the conference were in ,attendance and made it di ffi cult 
for the military to take other than a hard line posi·tion. 39 
Peace advocates had to contend mainly with three members of the 
Supreme Council: General Anami, War Minister; General Umezu, Army 
Chief of Staff; and Admiral Toyoda, Navy Chief of Staff. These men 
were particularly opposed to sections of the Potsdam Declaration which 
made them appear unscrupulous and liable to harsh punishment at war's 
end. The sentence in paragraph four which referred to "those self-
willed militaristic advisers" was especially distasteful to the military 
cabinet members. 40 The other active member of·the military in the 
37Kase, Journey to the Missouri, p. 148; and Butow, Decision to 
Surrender, p. 12. · 
38B utow ca 11 ed the advisers the "fanati ca 1 young officer e 1 ement. 11 
Decision to Surrender, p. 82n19. Maruyama also referred to "ruffians 
associ atedwi th the mi 1 i tary" who manipulated the subordinates. Thought 
and Behavior, pp. 107-8. 
39Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 200; and Kase, . 
Journey to the Missouri, p. 89. The Secretariat consisted of the Chiefs 
of the Military and Naval Affairs Bureau, the Vice-Chiefs of the Army 
and Navy General Staffs, and the Chief Cabinet Secretary. Maruyama, 
Thought and Behavior, pp. 108 and 323. The Chief Cabinet Secretary, 
Sakomizu7:rfsatsune, was probably the only member who endorsed peace 
negotiations. His father-in-law was Okada Keisuke who has already been 
named as a member of the peace faction and was the one to recommend 
Sakomizu for the position. Brooks, Behind Japan's Surrender, p. 27; and 
USS BS, Japan I s _Stru99·1 e, p. 3. 
4
°Kawai, 11 Mokusatsu, 11 pp. 411 and 412n6. 
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Supreme Council, Navy Minister Yanai, seemed to take a somewhat-more 
conciliatory view toward ending the hostilities. As noted above Yanai 
as Navy Minister in the Koiso cabinet had Takagi carry out an investi-
gation on war potential. Since Takagi 1s conclusions, which the Minister 
had known prior to taking the position, were at variance with the mili-
tary' s general position, it seems evident that Yanai cannot-be counted 
with the other military members of the Supreme Counci 1. 41 During 
interrogations after the war the Navy Minister stat~d that he had voiced 
an opinion to Suzuki that the war should not be continued. This state-
ment may have been to save himself from Allied retribution, but-it is 
now genera 1 ly accepted that he opposed the war .. 42 Vona i was in the 
confidence of Ki do and agreed with the _Lord Keeper that peace maneuvers 
were necessary in June, 1945. ~3 
On the morning of August 7 ,- after the atomic bomb had been dropped 
on Hiroshima, Suzuki and Togo conferred with the ·Emperor and stated 
that the time had come.to accept the Potsdam Declaration. Kido had also 
spoken to the Emperor and had voiced the same opinion. 44 - The Supreme 
~ . 
Counci 1 met that same day; the army attempted to minimi~e the bombi_ng 
and wanted to await a more thorough investigation. In the meantime the 
army desired four conditions imposed on any negotiations.toward peace; 
41 Gayn, Japan Diary, pp. 274-76 and 280; USSBS., Japan's 
Struggle, p. 3. 
42ussBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials {Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1946), II, 332, i nterroga ti on of Vona i. 
See also USSBS, Interrogations, II, 319, interrogation of Nomura; and 
Brooks, Behind Japan's Surrender, _p. 53. 
43 IMTFE, pp. 31153-54. 
44ussss, Japan's Struggle, p. 8; and Butow, Decision to Surrender, 
P~ 152n35. 
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these were: (1) the position of the Emperor had to be maintained; (2) 
there should be no occupation of the Japanese homeland; (3) Japan would 
withdraw and disarm her own troops; and (4) war criminals could be tried 
and punished by Japan. 45 The conditions prescribed by the military 
members showed how thoroughly unaware they were of the Al 1 ies' insis-
tence on unconditional surrender. 
The failure of the Supreme Council to make a decision and reach 
unity on a surrender formula brought Togo to eventually suggest an 
I mpe ri a 1 Conference, i . e. the Emperor p 1 us the "big six, 11 which was to 
meet late August 9. During the day there was a great deal of discussion 
by the peace faction. Confidential meetings were held to develop a 
strategy which could be used in the Imperial Conference to convince the 
11 war-continuation 11 group of the necessity for inmediate peace. Shige-
mitsu met with Kido and contended that the four conditions set by the 
mi 1 i ta ry would be viewed by the A 11 i es as a rejection. Ki do met with 
the Emperor and stated that the only alternative left to Japan was to 
surrender to the Potsdam terms; he found the Emperor likeminded. 46 
At the Imperial Conference, Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda were opposed 
to any surrender without the four conditions. Togo and Yonai unexpec-
tedly had another man on their side. Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro who was 
not a member of the Council but who was present asked several embarras-
sing questions of the military, especially as to their ability to 
45Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, p. 359; Jones, Japan's New 
Order, Po 444; and USSBS, Japari's Struggle, p. 8. 
461MTFE, pp. 31172 and 31176; and Butow, Decision to Surrender, 
pp. 153 and 159n56. 
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continue the war. 47 His position came as a surprise since he had been 
against earlier peace moves and had been decidedly for the "Fundamental 
Policy II issued June 6. 48 Suzuki seemed to remain undecided, so in the 
early morning hours of August 12 the old Premier turned to the Emperor 
and asked for an imperial decision. Suzuki already knew· the Emperor's 
position which had been related to him by Kida at the Emperor's ·request; 
therefore, the Premier was instrumental in the final decision. 49 
Hirohito admonished the Council to "endure the unendurable and suffer 
what is insufferable." 
During the next few days discuss i ans continued in the Supreme · 
Council and in the Cabinet on the question of accepting unconditional 
surrender. It was not until August 14 over the opposition of Anami and 
Umezu that the final decision was made, and this at the insistence of 
the Emperor. 50 
In summation one might note that although the desire for modifica-
tion of the uncondi ti ona l policy was present prior to the Potsdam 
Conference, the steps toward revision were either slow or ineffectual. 
Zacharias made the first and probably only documented revision when he 
relayed President Truman's speech calling for the unconditional 
47Brooks, Behind Japan's Surrender, p. 80; and William Craig, The 
Fall of Japan (New York: The Dial Press, 1967), p. 117. 
48rbid., p. 143. Butow regarded the Baron as a "jingoistic 
nati ona 1 i st 11 as late as April but also noted that his position be con-
sidered in the light of haragei. Decision to Surrender, p. 69 and 
69n46. 
49sutow, Decision to Surrender, p. 153; and Brooks, Behind Japan's 
Surrender, p. 171. -
5
°For a detailed description of the final meetings at which essen-
tially the same arguments were voiced pro and con as at the meeting of 
August 9-10, see Butow, Decision to Surrender. 
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surrender of the armed forces. This change was carried out in the final 
Potsdam communique, but, as important as this change was, it did not 
satisfy Japanese 1 eadership groups. Zacharias nevertheless continued to 
emphasize the need for further clarification. Suggestions for altera-
tion of the formula were a 1 so made by Stimson, Grew and others, but the 
final statement on which the United States based its surrender program--
the Potsdam Declaration--was unconditional surrender, essentially 
undisturbed. In regard to the Japanese it would seem that more than any 
other factor the necessity for unity in the Supreme Counci 1 hampered the 
debates on accepting the Potsdam Declaration. The fact that it took an 
i mperi a 1 decision to a 1 ter this requirement shows the tenacity of the 
military opposition. 
There has always been a great deal of debate on what finally 
brought about the surrender. Arguments have centered around two events 
unrelated to internal political struggles but which played a large role 
in the final decision--the atomic bombs and Russia's entry into the war. 
Perhaps sufficient attention has not been given to factors, such as 
unconditional surrender, which were present during the whole course of 
final discussions. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Several questions arise in any evaluation of wisdom and effective-
ness of the unconditional formula. Would certain-American modifications 
have made its acceptance more palatable? The most logical clia_nge would 
have been on the Japanese imperial structure, but a serious and substan-
tial change on this point never came.· Apparently the Japanese accepted 
Byrnes' reply, i.e. the Emperor would have no power but might be per-
mitted to remain, because of its omissions rather than its content. 1 
Potsdam would have been the appropriate place and the opportune time 
to alter the unconditional policy since the individuals with authority 
were present, and Japan by that time remained the sole bell_igerent. Yet 
the declaration which called for the unconditional surrender of the 
"Japanese armed forces II rather than the government was not a signifi~ant 
change. This was not innovative or imaginative thinking but policy-
making which was tied to the proposa 1 s of the past. Hanson Ba 1 dwi n, a 
critic of American wartime policy, called it "merely a restatement of 
the politically impossible. 11-2 
President Roosevelt used a military term, at least in the context 
of his thinking on the Lee-Grant surrender, ·in an attempt to gain a 
1For an analysis of these points see Chapter III. 
2Hanson w. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War {New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1949), p. 92. 
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pol i ti cal solution. He looked back to the failure of World War I, for-
ward to shaping the Axis into non-belligerent nations, and at the time 
presented the policy without consulting his political and military 
advisers or the Allied nations. 3 One can understand the continuation of 
a pol i cy during the tenure of its author, but one wonders why Truman 1 et 
it remain with but s 1 i ght a 1 terati on. Perhaps he did not realize at the 
time as he was later to write that 11 a major difficulty that_ arises in 
connection with such a formula as unconditional surrender is that it 
cuts across the line which should divide political from military 
decisions. 114 
Others realized this neglect of the political sphere of wartime 
pol i cy-ma king. Ao hes on wrote of a 11 dri fti ng State Department, 11 McCl oy 
commented on the slight attention given to political thinking, and 
Baldwin cal led unconditional surrender 11 a policy of political bank-
ruptcy. 115 The idea was to postpone all issues unti 1 the end of the war 
to show A 11 i ed determination in the war effort and so as not to unduly 
burden war planning. The problem of this practice was-~hat·war planning 
3Dwight Eisenhower, Crusade in EuroMe (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Company, 1958), p. 489n7;aurice Matloff and Edwin M. 
Snell, United States ArrrtY in World War II. The War Department: Strategic 
Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42:-[Washington, D. C.: Office of 
the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), p. 380; 
Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV: The Hinge of Fate 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953},pp. 684-85 and 687-88; Robert 
Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins; an Intimate History (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1950), pp. 696-97. 
4Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 1, Year of Decisions (Gar.den City, 
New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955), p. 210. 
5oean Acheson, Present at the Creation; !1l_ Years in the State 
Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969)--;-p. 38; John J. 
McCloy, The Challenge to Ameri·can Foreign Po,licy (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1953), p. 44; and Baldwin, Mistakes of the War, p. 24. 
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and pol icy planning were complementary. and .virtually insepara.ble aspects 
of the same goal--winning the war. 6 
Baldwin called unconditional.surrender "perhaps the.bi-ggest ·politi-
cal mistake of the war. 117 It. was a.mistake in the .sense. that. insteacl of· 
making significant changes in the policy .. Roosevelt and.Truman only tried. 
to lessen its psychological impact. Roosevelt called it.a: "reasonable 
assurance for world peace; 11 Truman. explained that it did~riot mean "the 
extennination or enslavement of_ the.Japanese ·people.--"~ The. idea that any 
alteration of the pol icy would. be considered a sign of:.:weakness ·and per-
haps spur the Japanese to a greater. war effort was an. oft .. repeated and 
. t t .d t· g 1mpor an cons, era ,on. I nerti.a, . therefore, hampered in no .small way 
any significant modification. 
In regard to Japanese acceptaoce. tbe.·question on tbe. advisability 
of the pol icy rests mainly on whether it hampered.the peace party and 
aided the war-continuation faction_and.:if.it had the effect,· .. therefore, 
of prolonging the war. 
The Japanese,. it would seem,_ were .. not. so interested·_ in-explanatio·ns 
as they were in alterations, .. especial]y.meaningful ones.· Japanese 
officials knew of Zacharias'. broadcasts 9 _Grew 1 s effort-to-retain.the 
imperi a 1 sys tern 9 and. certain. Al J ied -unrespons; veness to_ the. uncondi ti ona 1 
6Gaddis Smith, Americaa_Djp]omacy_During the Second World~. 
1941-45 (New York: .John Wiley.and_sons.,--Inc. 1 T965}, p. 51, 
7Baldwin, Mistakes of tbe. War,. p. 14. 
8 sherwood, . Roos eve 1 t ·and. l:lopkl ns, - p .. - 696; and Ell j s. M •. Zacharias, 
Secret Missions;. the Stora oL!!!_~lntell:igence Officer.{New. York: G, P. 
Putnam's Sons, ·19"4b'T, p. or. 
9Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge. Buody, On Acti-ve Serv:ice. it!. Peace 
and War (New York: Harper and. Brothers~· l94TT, p. 6280 
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doctrine. What they were looking for was a negotiated peace. Foreign 
Minister Togo later wrote that the American insistence on unconditional 
surrender hampered the peace movement in Japan. 10 Yet an astute 
observer of the Japanese political scene noticed a pattern in the hier-
archy similar to the American situation. Inertia in Japan's elite was 
as much a problem to surrender as in America. Maruyama believed that 
the leaders merely adapted themselves to existing policies and were 
always being dragged along by "forces of circumstances. 1111 The leaders 
were often carried along by faits accomplis which tended to keep the 
peace faction doci 1 e and make the war-continuation group belligerent. 
An excel 1 ent example of this would be the SCOW meeting of June 6, 1945, 
and the unanimous acceptance of the "Fundamental Policy," a decision to 
r.~ntinue the full prosecution of the war. 12 
Hul 1 was probably incorrect when he wrote that Japan surrendered 
when she perceived that "unconditional surrender could be applied con-
ditionally. 1113 Zacharias also accepted this view since he felt that if 
interpretations had been given to uncondi ti anal surrender in June rather 
than in July, the war would have been ·ended without the two dramatic 
events of August. 14 Yet as far as I can determine, the Japanese 
10Togo Shi genori , The Cause of Japan, trans. and ed. Togo Fumi hi ko 
and Ben Bruce Blakeney (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), pp. 316-17. 
11 Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Poli ti cs, 
ed. Ivan Morris (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 105 and 
107-08. 
12see above Chapter IV, p. 53. 
13cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: MacMillan 
Company),.1948, p. 1582°:- -
14zacharias, Secret Missions, pp. 367-68. 
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officials never thought there was any real change in the· unconditfonal 
fonnul a. Byrnes' reply 15 caused as much opposition to· surrendering as 
earlier proposals. It was neither the atomic bombs nor.Russia's entry 
into the war, therefore, which. actually:made ·the Japanese surrender, . 
but these circumstances brought. a. sense of: urgency and. forced. the hand 
of the Japanese, making defeat a reality. 16 Naval Minister Toyoda· 
stated during an interrogation after the war that, apart from ·Soviet. 
intervention, the navy would probab]y have been unwil1ing: to terminate 
the war. 17 This attitude would have been. even more true.of.~ttie army. 
The final and most difficult. quest:ion then remains~~did.the.uncon-
ditional surrender policy have the.effect.·of._prolonging·the war?· 
Several knowledgeable individuals.have~taken the posit:ion .. .that.it had 
such a consequence. Grew and Stimson took this -pas ition,-. especia 1 ly as 
it related to the Emperor's future.status .• Zacharias.and.Butow also 
considered it a likely possibility. 18 s .. A. Golunsky,.Associate.Counsel 
at the IMTFE, argued that unconditionaL surrender might-have.had the 
15see above Chapter III, p. 34n34. 
Uni ve~:~~~ePr!~~~i ~~~~) 1 J~~~n;¥~~~~jh;j~1s~~~~!d (~~:t~::e~ir!~!;ic Bomb-
ing Sur~ey! Japan's Stru~gle !Q.~ End.!!!! War (Washington~:·o·.· c,:· Govern-
ment Pr, n t, ng Office , 1 9 6) , p. T2:-
17 united States, Strategic Bombing Survey, -Interrogations of 
Japanese Officials, II (Washington, D. C.:· Government Printing.OTfice, 
1946), 320, interrogating Toyoda. 
18Joseph c. Grew, Turbulent Era • .l!. Diplomatic Record. of Forfl Years, 
ed. Walter Johnson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, .l952T.".·p •. 28. 
Stimson, On Active Service, pp •. 628-69; Zacharias, Secret Missions, p. 
335; and Robert Butow, Japan's Decision to Su·rrender (Stanford, Cali~ 
fornia: Stanford University Press, 1954)-;-pp. 132-35, ·One.author noted 
that "the charge that unconditional surrender prolonged. Japan's will to· 
fight is less substantial and applies primarily to the.Amer:ican refus~l 
to promise that Japan could keep the institution of-the Emperor." Smith, 
Diplomacy, p. 57. 
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effect of prolonging the war, but only indirectly. It was, he felt, 
Japan I s refusal to accept the doctrine and not the formula i~self which 
caused the Russians to fear an indefinite extension of the conflict. ~9 
It would seem that a message as ambiguous as Byrnes' reply would 
not have been sufficient to bring about an earlier surrender, while a 
clear-cut position on the Emperor would have amounted to rejecting the 
policy--which Byrnes and Truman were unwilling to do. Certainly a degree 
of rhetoric was i nvo 1 ved as well as a desire on the part of some Japanese 
officials to maintain their privileged positions by keeping the imperial 
institution. Yet the arguments for surrender, with the _stipulation that 
the imperial system remain intact, seem to have been sincerely motivated. 
In the final analysis it seems that the formula did not significantly. 
prolong the war. 
19 Bu tow, Decision to Surrender, p. l 58n54. 
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